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S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS ALLOWED TAX WINDFALL:
SUPREME COURT RESOLVES CONTROVERSY REGARDING
THE IMPACT OF CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS
INCOME ON S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS
TIMOTHY R. Kosri*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gitlitz v. Commissioner,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that S corporation shareholders can increase their stock basis by cancel-
lation of indebtedness (COD) income2 excluded from the corporation's
income under section 108(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.3 The Court
also held that this basis increase occurs after the tax attribute reduction
required by section 108(b).4 The Supreme Court's decision results in a
windfall to S corporation shareholders by exempting them from tax on
COD income while allowing them to increase their stock basis and
deduct previously suspended losses.5
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Gitlitz is a difficult
one. Courts addressing the issue have differed significantly in both the
result reached and the analysis used. 6 Commentators also disagree on
* J.D., 1985, University of North Dakota; LL.M. in Taxation, 1986, Southern Methodist
University; Ph.D. in Accounting, 1998, University of Missouri-Columbia. Timothy R. Koski is a
certified public accountant and an attorney specializing in taxation. He has several years experience
as both a CPA and as an attorney. He currently teaches tax and accounting at the University of
Southern Indiana.
1. 121 S. Ct. 701 (2001).
2. Gitlitz, 121 S. Ct. at 708. Cancellation of indebtedness income is also referred to as discharge
of indebtedness income. As used herein, COD income means cancellation of indebtedness income or
discharge of indebtedness income.
3. Id. Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended. See generally 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
4. Gitlitz, 121 S. Ct. at 709.
5. 1& at 708-09.
6. The Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along with the Tax Court, have used different reason-
ing to decide this issue in favor of the Service. See Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F.3d 524 (6th Cir.
2000); Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000); Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143
(10th Cir. 1999); Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114 (1998), affid 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have decided this issue in favor of the taxpayer. See United States v.
Farley, 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the proper resolution of the issue. 7 The Sixth Circuit summarized the
difficulty of the issue as follows:
As the conflicting decisions of the other courts that have analyzed
this issue demonstrate, interpreting the Internal Revenue Code is about as
easy as swimming through mud. The sections at issue, 108, 1366, and
1367, while seemingly clear on their faces, become muddy when they
are applied in conjunction with each other.8
This article reviews the impact of COD income on S corporation
shareholders. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the different
statutory interpretations that courts have used to resolve the issue. The
article also discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gitlitz.
II. THE OPERATIVE STATUTES
A. S CORPORATION TAXATION
A corporation that makes an election under Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code is generally not subject to federal income tax. 9
Instead, S corporation income (or loss) is passed through on a pro-rata
basis and taken into account in determining the shareholder's tax. 10
Section 1366(a)(1) provides that both nonseparately computed income
(or loss) and separately stated items are taken into account in determin-
ing the shareholder's taxable income.11 Separately stated items are
"items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or
credit the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of
any shareholder."12 Section 1366(b) provides that the character of S
corporation items in a shareholder's hands is "determined as if [the]
item[s] were realized directly from the source .. . realized by the
7. See generally Richard M. Lipton, Tax Court Rejects S Corp. Basis Step-Up for COD Income in
Nelson, 88 J. TAX'N 272 (1998); Richard M. Lipton, The Impact of Excluded COD Income on S
Shareholders-The Tenth Circuit Gets Lost in Gitlitz, 91 J. TAX'N 197 (1999); Richard M. Lipton,
Different Courts Adopt Different Approaches to the Impact of COD Income on S Corporations, 92 J.
TAX'N 207 (2000); James D. Lockhart & James E. Duffy, Tax Court Rules in Nelson that S Corporation
Excluded COD Income Does Not Increase Shareholder Stock Basis, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287
(1999); James F. Loebl, Does the Excluded COD Income of an Insolvent S Corporation Increase the
Basis of the Shareholders' Stock?, 52 FLA. L. Rav. 957 (2000).
8. Gaudiano, 216 F.3d at 533.
9. I.R.C. § 1363(a) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 1363(a) (1994)). Although
an S corporation is a pass-through entity and not subject to federal income tax, it may be subject to (1)
built-in gains tax under section 1374, (2) tax on excess net passive income under section 1375, and (3)
LIFO (last-in, first-out) recapture tax under section 1363(d).
10. I.R.C. § 1366 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 1366 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1). Nonseparately computed income or loss is defined as gross income
minus allowable deductions, determined by excluding separately stated items as described in section
1366(a)(1)(A). See I.R.C. § 1366(a)(2).
12. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A). Common separately stated items include interest, dividends, capital
gains and losses, charitable contributions, and the section 179 election to immediately expense the cost
of tangible personal property placed in service.
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corporation."13 If an S corporation realizes a capital gain, for example,
section 1366(b) ensures that the item will remain a capital gain after it
passes through to shareholders.14
In order to prevent double taxation of amounts distributed by an S
corporation to its shareholders, section 1367(a)(1) provides that a share-
holder's basis in his or her S corporation stock is increased by both non-
separately computed income and separately stated items. 15 Likewise, a
shareholder's basis in his or her S corporation stock is decreased by
nonseparately computed loss and separately stated items of loss and
deduction. 16
An S corporation shareholder cannot deduct S corporation losses to
the extent that the losses exceed his or her adjusted basis in the S
corporation stock plus debt that the S corporation owes the
shareholder. 17 Losses that cannot be deducted because of insufficient
basis are suspended and carryover indefinitely until the shareholder's
basis in his or her stock and debt is large enough to permit the
deduction. 18
B. COD INCOME
COD income is included in gross income under section 61(a)(12). 19
Section 108(a)(1), however, provides several exceptions to this general
rule.2 0 Under section 108(a)(1)(B), COD income is excluded from
income if "the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent." 2 1
Insolvency is defined as the excess of liabilities over the fair market
value of assets, determined immediately before the debt discharge. 22
13. I.R.C. § 1366(b).
14. Id.
15. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1) (1994)).
The basis of a shareholder's stock in an S corporation is also increased by the excess of depletion
deductions over the basis of property subject to depletion. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1)(C).
16. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2). The basis of a shareholder's stock in an S corporation is also decreased
by distributions not included in the shareholder's income under section 1368 and by corporate items
that are nondeductible and not chargeable to capital. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(D). In addition, a share-
holder's stock basis is decreased by the shareholder's deduction for depletion of oil and gas property
held by the S corporation to the extent that it "does not exceed the proportionate share of the adjusted
basis of such property allocated to [the] shareholder under section 613A(c)( l1)(B)." I.R.C. §
1367(a)(2)(E).
17. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1).
18. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2).
19. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994)).
20. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)). The exceptions to the general rule of income exclusion are if the "(A) discharge
occurs in a title 11 [bankruptcy] case, (B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent, (C) the
indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness, [and] (D) in the case of a taxpayer other than
a C corporation, the indebtedness discharged is qualified real property business indebtedness." Id.
21. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).
22. I.R.C. § 108(d)(3).
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Taxpayers pay a price for section 108's exclusion from income. 23
Section 108(b) provides that taxpayers must reduce certain tax attributes,
items that could yield future tax benefits, by the amount of income
excluded under section 108(a). 24 Tax attributes are reduced by exclud-
ed COD income in the following order: (1) net operating loss (NOL), (2)
general business credit, (3) minimum tax credit, (4) capital loss carry-
over, (5) the basis of property of the taxpayer, (6) passive activity loss
and credit carryovers, and (7) foreign tax credit carryovers. 25  In the
case of an S corporation, section 108(d)(7)(B) provides that the attribute
reduction rule is applied at the corporate level. 26  S corporation losses
disallowed because a shareholder has a zero basis in his stock are treated
as NOLs subject to reduction. 27
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN S CORPORATION TAXATION AND COD
INCOME
The issue addressed in Gitlitz arises when COD income of an S
corporation is excluded from income under section 108 and the share-
holder has suspended losses under section 1366(d)(1).28 Two basic
issues arise. 29 The first issue is whether COD income excluded from
income under section 108(a) is an "item of income" under section
1366(a)(1), resulting in an increase in an S corporation shareholder's
basis under section 1367(a)(1). 30 If the shareholder's basis is increased
by excluded COD income, the second issue, whether the increase occurs
before or after the corporate level tax attribute reduction required under
section 108(d)(7)(B), becomes important. 3 1 Because suspended losses
are treated as NOLs subject to reduction under section 108(b), they are
not available to increase the basis of the shareholder's stock and to allow
deduction of suspended losses if attribute reduction occurs before the
section 1367(a)(1) basis increase. 32
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE
Courts have struggled with the issue of whether S corporation
shareholders can increase their stock basis by excluded COD income and
23. United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2000).
24. I.R.C. § 108(b)(2).
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(B).
27. Id.
28. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 121 S. Ct. 701, 704 (2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 708-09.
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thereby deduct suspended losses.33 This section of the article discusses
the different analyses used by courts before the Supreme Court's
decision in Gitlitz.
A. THE TAX COURT POSITION
The Tax Court first dealt with this issue in Winn v. Commissioner.34
Winn and Gitlitz, the taxpayers, were different shareholders in the same
S corporation. 35 They were shareholders in PDW&A, Inc., an S corpora-
tion that was a partner in Parker Properties Joint Venture. 36 The
partnership realized COD income in 1991.37 PDW&A was insolvent
when it realized its share of the partnership's COD income. 38 Both Winn
and Gitlitz increased the basis of their PDW&A stock by their pro-rata
share of the COD income. 39 As a result, they each claimed significant
losses that, without the basis increase, would have been suspended under
section 1366(d)(1).40
Although the Service raised several arguments in support of various
motions, it abandoned these arguments at trial.41 At trial, the Service
contended that COD is not an "item of income" under section
1366(a)(1). 42 This was the only issue dealt with by the court.43 The Ser-
vice conceded that if excluded COD income was an item of income
under section 1366(a) it would flow through to the shareholders and
increase their basis, allowing them to deduct previously suspended
losses.4
33. Winn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawn and replaced, 75 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1840 (1998); Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114 (1998), aff'd 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cit.
1999); Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999); Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 496
(7th Cir. 2000); Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Farley, 202
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000).
34. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawn and replaced, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1840 (1998).
35. Winn, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3167.
36. d
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. PDW&A's share of the partnership's COD income was $2,021,296. Id. PDW&A was
insolvent by $2,181,748 when it realized the COD income. Id. Both Winn and Gitlitz increased their
stock basis by $1,010,648. Id.
40. Id. Winn did not claim any losses in 1991 because he believed that the passive activity loss
rules prevented him from doing so. Id. He claimed $1,010,648 of losses from PDW&A on his 1992
return. Id. Gitlitz claimed $1,010,648 of losses from PDW&A on his 1991 return. Id.
41. Id. at 3168.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The Service did not make this concession in later cases. As discussed herein, if excluded
COD income is held to be an item of income under section 1366(a)(1), several courts believe that the
timing of tax attribute reduction must still be addressed in determining whether S corporation
shareholders can deduct previously suspended losses. See discussion infra Parts III.B-E.
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In a memorandum decision, the Tax Court held that COD is an
"item of income" under section 1366(a)(1). 45 According to the court,
COD is an item of income for purposes of determining a shareholder's
basis in S corporation stock because of its inclusion in section 61's
definition of gross income. 46 Because section 61(a)(12) specifically
requires that COD be included in gross income, it is an "item of
income." 47 The court saw no reason to treat COD differently from
other items included in gross income under section 61 and excluded
from income under other sections of the Code.48
Winn was withdrawn less than a year after it was issued and super-
seded by Nelson v. Commissioner.49 In Nelson, the Tax Court held that
S corporation shareholders may not increase their stock basis by exclud-
ed COD income. 50 The taxpayer in Nelson was the sole shareholder in
Metro Auto, Inc. (MAI), an S corporation that realized COD income. 51
The COD income exceeded MAI's losses. 52 MAI was insolvent prior
and subsequent to realizing the COD income. 53 Nelson increased his
stock basis by the excluded COD income. 54 He later disposed of his
MAI stock and claimed a long-term capital loss. 55 The Service disal-
lowed a portion of the loss, claiming Nelson's stock basis did not include
the excluded COD income.56
In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court unanimously held that S corpo-
ration shareholders may not increase their stock basis by excluded
COD income. 57 The taxpayer in Nelson argued that COD income
is a separately-stated item of income (tax-exempt) under section
1366(a)(1)(A) that passes through to shareholders and increases
45. Winn, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3169.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Tax Court cited sections 61(a)(4) and 103 (relating to interest) and sections 61(a)(1)
and 101 (relating to insurance) as examples of items of income realized under section 61 and
excluded elsewhere. Id.
49. 110 T.C. 114 (1998), aff'd 182 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Winn v. Commissioner, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) 3167 (1997), withdrawn and replaced, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1840 (1998).
50. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 130. The Tax Court has reaffirmed the position taken in Nelson several
times thereafter. E.g., Bettisworth. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1424 (2000); Goodman v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1398 (2000); Mullen v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2000).
51. Nelson, I1lOT.C. at 115.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 116.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. COD income exceeded MAI's losses by $1,375,790. Id. This was the portion of the loss
disallowed by the Service. Id.
57. Id. at 130. There were two concurring opinions in Nelson. However, all nineteen Tax Court
judges agreed that S corporation shareholders may not increase their stock basis by excluded COD
income. Judge Beghe's and Judge Foley's concurring opinions discussed the issue of whether it is
necessary to decide whether excluded COD income is tax-exempt income under section
1366(a)(l)(A). Id.
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stock basis under section 1367(a)(1). 58 Under this analysis, section
108(b)(4)(A) governs the interaction between section 108(d)(7) and the
tax attribute reduction required by section 108(b)(2).59 Because section
108(b)(4)(A) provides that tax attribute reduction is made "after the
determination of the tax . . . for the taxable year of the discharge," the
suspended losses flow through to the shareholder before tax attribute
reduction. 60 Under this interpretation of section 108, the only purpose
of section 108(d)(7)(A) is to create uniformity between S corporation
shareholders. 61 A pro-rata amount of COD income is excluded from the
income of each shareholder to the extent that the S corporation is
insolvent. The solvency status of the shareholders is not relevant.62
The Tax Court interpreted section 108(d)(7)(A) broadly and held
that both the insolvency determination and the COD income exclusion
under section 108(a) apply at the corporate level. 63 The court stated that
it was applying the plain meaning of the statute and that the specific
provision of section 108(d)(7)(A) overrides the general provisions of
Subchapter S, including sections 1366(a) and 1367(a). 64 Because
section 108(d)(7)(A) precludes income recognition at the shareholder
level, the income does not pass through to shareholders under section
1366(a)(1)(A) and therefore cannot increase the shareholder's stock
basis under section 1367(a)(1)(A). 65 The excluded COD income, in
effect, "disappears" at the corporate level. 66 There is nothing to pass
through to the shareholders. 67
The Tax Court noted that section 108(d)(6) provides that COD
income exclusion is applied at the partner level in the case of a
partnership. 68 Thus, partnership COD income may impact partners dif-
ferently, depending on their financial position. In contrast, section
108(d)(7)(A) provides that COD income exclusion is applied at the
corporate level in the case of S corporations. 69 The court believed that
Congress intended to preclude separate treatment for S corporation
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 123-24.
60. Id. at 123.
61. Id. at 123-24.
62. See generally Nelson, 110 T.C. 114.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Id. at 124-25.
65. Id.
66. Richard M. Lipton, Tax Court Rejects S Corp. Basis Step-Up for COD Income in Nelson, 88 J.
TAX'N 272, 274 (1998).
67. Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 119 (1998).
68. Id. at 122.
69. I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 108 (d)(7)(A) (1994
& Supp. V 1999)).
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shareholders. 70 According to the court, "if Congress had intended a
step-up in basis to accompany the recognition of excluded COD income
at the shareholder level, it would have provided for statutory language
reaching that result." 71
The Tax Court majority rejected the taxpayer's argument that COD
income is "tax-exempt" income within the meaning of sections
1366(a)(1)(A) and 1367(a)(1)(A) and therefore statutorily required to
pass through to the shareholders pursuant to section 1366(a)(1)(A). 72
The Service has continually taken the position that excluded COD
income is tax-deferred income (as opposed to tax-exempt income) that
does not pass through to S corporation shareholders and increase their
stock basis.73 The Service first announced this position in Technical
Advice Memorandum (TAM) 94-23-00374 and has reiterated it several
times thereafter. 75 In fact, Treasury Regulation 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii)
provides that excluded COD income is not tax-exempt income.76
According to the Tax Court, section 108 is not designed to provide
a permanent exemption from tax. 77 COD income is tax-deferred, not
tax-exempt. 78 Tax deferral is accomplished through the reduction in tax
attributes required by section 108(b).79 Because section 108 is not
designed to be a permanent exemption from tax, the Tax Court majority
rejected the "argument that excluded COD income is 'tax-exempt' [in-
come] pursuant to section 1366(a)(1)(A) and, thus, is statutorily required
to pass through to the S corporation shareholders." 80
Judge Beghe and Judge Foley issued concurring opinions stressing
the fact that characterization of COD income as tax-exempt is not rele-
vant. 81 According to Judge Beghe, the only relevant inquiry is whether
excluded COD income is a pass-through item at all.82 Because section
108(d)(7)(A) provides that it doesn't pass through to the shareholders,
70. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 122-23.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 125.
73. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-23-003 (Feb. 28, 1994).
74. Id.
75. See generally Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-42-001 (July 10, 1995); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-006
(July 5, 1995).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) (2000). Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii) is effective for
S corporation taxable years beginning after August 18, 1998. Because it was not effective in the tax
years at issue, none of the cases reviewed herein addressed the validity of the regulation. Id.
77. Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 125 (1998).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 127-28.
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id. at 130, 137. Judge Halpern agreed with Judge Beghe's concurring opinion. Four other
judges agreed with Judge Foley's concurring opinion. Id.
82. Id. at 131 (Beghe, J., concurring).
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the question of whether it is tax-exempt isn't relevant. 83 Judge Foley
also saw no reason to distinguish between tax-deferred and tax-exempt
income.8 4 According to Judge Foley, "after the application of section
108(b) and the resulting reduction of tax attributes . . . there are no
'items of income,' tax-exempt or otherwise, to which section 1366(a)
may apply." 8 5
The majority opinion concluded by expressing concern over the
windfall that granting a basis increase would create. 86 The court did not
believe a taxpayer should be allowed a basis increase where he has
neither suffered an economic cost nor made an economic outlay. 87 In
the court's opinion, such a windfall was against section 108's statutory
approach of subjecting excluded COD income to tax in the future, via
section 108(b)'s tax attribute reduction. 88
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT POSITION
In Gitlitz, the Tenth Circuit reached the same result as the Tax Court
in Nelson, but for an entirely different reason. 89 According to the Tenth
Circuit, all items of income, including excluded COD income, are
attributed initially to the corporation. 90 Tax attribute reduction, however,
occurs before pass-through to the shareholders. 9 1 Suspended losses are
treated as NOLs subject to attribute reduction. 92 Thus, they are reduced
by excluded COD income. 93 Because this occurs at the corporate level,
the suspended losses are not available for use at the shareholder level.94
The Tenth Circuit first set forth its standard of review. 95  According
to the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court's holding that the Code should
not be interpreted to allow taxpayers the equivalent of a double
deduction, absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress, applies to
windfalls as well as deductions.96 The court made it clear that it would
adopt the taxpayer's position only if the position was unequivocally sup-
83. Id. at 134.
84. Id. at 137 (Foley, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id. at 123.
87. Id. at 129-30.
88. Id. at 130.
89. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 1143.
91. Id.
92. See I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(B) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 108(d)(7)(B)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
93. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(2).
94. Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1148-49.
95. Id. at 1145.
96. Id. at 1147-48 (paraphrasing the holding in United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684
(1969)).
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ported by statutory text. 97 While acknowledging that the position was
not without merit, the court did not believe Congress intended to confer
a windfall upon taxpayers with excluded COD income and suspended S
corporation losses.98
The Tenth Circuit held that all items are initially attributed to the S
corporation under section 1366(a)(1). 99 Because an S corporation is not
a taxpaying entity, however, the items must pass through to the share-
holders.100 The critical question, according to the Tenth Circuit, is when
attribute reduction occurs. 10 1 If attribute reduction occurs after pass-
through to the shareholders, COD income increases a shareholder's basis
under section 1367(a)(1).102 If attribute reduction occurs prior to pass-
through, on the other hand, excluded COD income is absorbed before it
passes to shareholders and is not available to increase their basis. 103
The court held that attribute reduction occurs before items pass
through to shareholders. 104 Because losses suspended under section
1366(d)(1) are treated as NOLs for purposes of section 108(b)(2)(A),
they are reduced by excluded COD income. 105 A shareholder's pro-
rata share of the NOL passes through only to the extent it is not
absorbed by the shareholder's pro-rata share of excluded COD
income.106
The Tenth Circuit struggled with the impact of section 108(b)(4)(A)
on the timing of attribute reduction. 107 As previously mentioned, section
108(b)(4)(A) provides that attribute reduction "shall be made after the
determination of the tax imposed . . . for the taxable year of the
discharge."108 While acknowledging there are different opinions on this
issue, the court saw section 108(b)(4)(A)'s role as simply computing
certain tax applications before reducing tax attributes.1 09 The limit on
deducting contributions to charity, for example, would be calculated
before attribute reduction.'1 0 The Tenth Circuit did not read section
97. Id. at 1148.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1149.
102. Id. at 1147.
103. Id. at 1148.
104. Id. at 1149.
105. Id. at 1148.
106. Id. at 1148-49.
107. Id. at 1149.
108. I.R.C. § 108(b)(4)(A) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 108(b)(4)(A)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
109. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 1999).
110. Id. Other examples of tax applications cited by the court were establishing income ceilings
for section 108(b)(2) deductions/credits and evaluating applications of possible alternative minimum
tax. Id.
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108(b)(4)(A) as mandating attribute reduction "in the tax year follow-
ing the year of the discharge."I11
The court confined its holding to excluded COD income. 1 2 The
court made it clear that the exceptions treating excluded COD income at
the corporate level under section 108(d)(7)(A) and section 108(b)'s tax
attribute reduction do not apply to other forms of tax-exempt income.11 3
According to the Tenth Circuit, the critical distinction between COD
income and other types of excluded income, such as interest on
municipal bonds, is the initial economic outlay. 114 Unlike purchasers of
municipal bonds, S corporation shareholders with excluded COD income
have made no economic outlay.11 5
C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT POSITION
In Witzel v. Commissioner116 the Seventh Circuit decided the issue
differently than the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit. In an opinion by
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit first held that tax attribute reduction
occurs at the corporate level before income is passed through to
shareholders.l17 As a result, excluded COD income reduces S corpora-
tion losses suspended under section 1366(d)(1).118 Thus, the taxpayer in
Witzel did not receive the immediate windfall of both excluding COD
income and deducting previously suspended S corporation losses.119
This portion of Witzel is consistent with the Tax Court's decision in
Nelson and the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gitlitz.120
According to Judge Posner, however, the shareholder's stock basis
is increased by excluded COD income. 121 Judge Posner stated that
section 1366 is explicit in passing through tax-exempt income to share-
holders, and excluded COD income is tax-exempt in the fullest sense. 122
Therefore, the court concluded that excluded COD income increases the
shareholder's basis under section 1367, even though the shareholder
isn't able to deduct existing suspended losses because of section
108(d)(7)(A).123 Although shareholders are not able to deduct existing
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1151.
113. Id. The court assumed that COD income is tax-exempt income. Id. at 1151 n.7. They did
not directly address the issue. Id. at 1151.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000).
117. Witzel, 200 F.3d at 498.
118. Id. at 497.
119. See generally Witzel, 200 F.3d at 496-98.
120. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B.
121. Witzel, 200 F.3d at 496-98.
122. Id. at 498.
123. Id.
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suspended losses, the basis increase proposed by the Seventh Circuit may
enable them to deduct suspended losses in the future or decrease capital
gain realized upon the sale of their stock.124
D. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT POSITION
In Gaudiano v. Commissioner125 the Sixth Circuit followed the
reasoning of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits in connection with the
ordering of attribute reduction. The Sixth Circuit thought that attribute
reduction must occur at the corporate level before pass-through to
shareholders. 126 The court expressed concern that if attribute reduction
is made after COD income passes through to shareholders there will be
no attribute reduction at the corporate level.127 The court did not think
that section 108(b)(4)(A) precluded the reduction of tax attributes in the
year of discharge:
Specifically, section 108(b)(4)(B) provides that reductions of
net operating loss for the taxable year of discharge and any net
operating loss carryover and any capital loss carryover shall be
made "first in the loss for the taxable year of discharge."
Thus, the corporation must determine its net operating losses
and suspended operating losses for the year of discharge and
reduce those attributes by the amount of COD income realized.
If the losses exceed the COD income, then the extra losses pass
through to the shareholders. 128
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court and Tenth Circuit's
findings that COD income is not income under section 1366(a)(1) and
therefore does not pass through to shareholders and increase their stock
basis.129 Agreeing with Judge Posner's opinion in Witzel, the court
reasoned that COD is income under section 1366(a)(1)(A) because: (1)
COD income is not always tax-deferred, it may be truly tax-exempt if no
124. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated:
We offer this view tentatively, in part because the Tenth Circuit has held the contrary
and we are reluctant to precipitate an intercircuit conflict, in part because Mr. Witzel
may never again have suspended losses, making the issue rather moot as to him unless he
someday sells his stock and his capital-gains tax liability is affected by his basis (higher in
our view than the Tax Court's), and in part because a recently promulgated Treasury
Regulation (not applicable to this case, however, because it applies only to tax years
beginning on or after August 18, 1998) adopts the Tax Court's interpretation of section
1366 that we are criticizing.
Id.
125. 216 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2000).
126. Gaudiano, 216 F. 3d. at 534.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. This was also the Tax Court's position in Nelson.
258 [VOL. 77:247
2001] S CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS ALLOWED TAX WINDFALL
suspended losses are available to offset the income, and (2) section
1366(a) is not limited to tax-exempt income. 130
The Sixth Circuit went on to hold that because COD income is
income under section 1366(a)(1)(A) it increases stock basis under
section 1367(a)(1)(A).131 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, the Sixth
Circuit thought that only COD income remaining after current and
suspended losses are reduced at the corporate level would flow through
to the shareholders and increase their stock basis.132
E. THE THIRD CIRCUIT POSITION
In United States v. Farley,133 the Third Circuit held that S corpora-
tion shareholders could increase their stock basis by excluded COD in-
come and thereby deduct suspended losses. 34 The taxpayers in Farley
were shareholders in two separate S corporations. 135 They obtained in-
come tax refunds as a result of increasing the basis in their S corporation
stock by excluded COD income and thereby deducting previously
suspended losses. 136 After initially issuing refunds, the Service dis-
allowed the basis increase and brought suit in district court to recover the
refunds. 137
Like the Tenth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits, the Third Circuit be-
lieved that the ultimate disposition of this issue hinges on the interaction
of sections 108(d)(7)(A) and 108(b)(4)(A).138 However, it disagreed
with the other circuits on the timing of pass-through.139 The Third
Circuit held that attribute reduction occurs after the COD income is
passed through to shareholders. 140
According to the Third Circuit, the "statutory language is unam-
biguous, and the operation of the statutory language is straight-
forward."14 1 Section 108(b)(4)(A) "clearly indicates that tax attributes
are reduced on the first day of the tax year following the year of the
discharge of indebtedness." 142 Thus, tax attribute reduction takes place
after income has passed through to S corporation shareholders and
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 537.
133. 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
134. Farley, 202 F.3d at 206.
135. Id. at 199.
136. Id. The taxpayers in Farley obtained the refunds in late 1995 and early 1996 after filing
amended returns for 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1993. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 205.
139. Id. at 205-06.
140. Id. at 206.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 205.
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increased their stock basis. 143 Income pass-through is a necessary
prerequisite to "[the determination of] the tax imposed by this chapter
for the taxable year of the discharge" as required by section
108(b)(4)(A).144
While the Third Circuit went on to discuss the Service's contentions
at length, it did not find any of the Service's arguments controlling. 145
The clear and unambiguous language of the Code requires that S
corporation income pass through to shareholders and increase their
stock basis before tax attribute reduction.' 4 6 In Farley, the Third Circuit
became the first court of appeals to rule in favor of the taxpayer and
allow S corporation shareholders the windfall of excluding COD from
income while increasing their stock basis and deducting previously
suspended losses.
F. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT POSITION
In Pugh v. Commissioner147 the Eleventh Circuit joined the Third
Circuit in holding that an S corporation's COD income passes through
to its shareholders under Section 1366(a)(1) and increases their basis. 148
The taxpayer in Pugh was a shareholder in an insolvent S corporation
that realized COD income. 149 Unlike the taxpayers in Nelson, Gitlitz,
Witzel, and Farley, however, the taxpayer in Pugh had no suspended
losses under section 1366(d).150 The taxpayer's stock became worthless,
and he increased his stock basis by the excluded COD income when
calculating his capital loss.15 1 The Service contended that excluded COD
income could not be used to increase stock basis.152
The Eleventh Circuit held that excluded COD income is tax-exempt
income required to pass through to S corporation shareholders under
143. Id. at 206.
144. Id.
145. See generally Loebl, supra note 7, for a complete discussion of this portion of the Farley
opinion.
146. United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit was well
aware of the fact that the windfall allowed to S corporation shareholders may not have been what
Congress intended. The court stated:
We are aware that the result reached today in interpreting the relevant statutory
language may not have been the result intended by Congress. However, we are not free
to disregard the clear and unambiguous language of the controlling statutes. It is the fun-
ction of this court to interpret the statutory language as written. If policy considerations
suggest that the Code should be amended, Congress can do so. We may not.
Id. at 212 n.10.
147. 213 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000).
148. Pugh, 213 F.3d at 1326.
149. Id. at 1325.
150. Id. at 1328-29.
151. Id. at 1327.
152. Id. at 1327-28.
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section 1366(a)(1)(A).1 53 According to the Eleventh Circuit, nothing in
the Code distinguishes excluded COD income from other tax-exempt
items, such as tax-exempt bond interest and life insurance proceeds.154
While acknowledging the merit of the Service's argument that a basis
increase should not be allowed when the taxpayer has made no eco-
nomic outlay, the court went on to hold that because excluded COD
income passes through to shareholders under section 1366(a)(1)(A), it
must increase basis under section 1367(a)(1)(A).155 This result is
required even when the shareholder has no suspended losses to offset the
COD income. 156 The taxpayer in Pugh was able to claim a larger capital
loss because of this basis increase. 157
Because the taxpayer had no tax attributes to reduce, the court did
not rule on whether tax attribute reduction occurs before or after income
passes through to shareholders. 158 Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gitlitz, the Third Circuit was the only circuit court of appeals
to rule in favor of the taxpayer on the timing of attribution reduction
issue.159
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gitlitz and resolved the
conflict among the circuits. 160 In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer. 161 The Supreme Court
first held that excluded COD is an "item of income" that passes through
to shareholders under section 1366 and increases their stock basis under
section 1367.162 The Court used the plain meaning of the statute to
reach its conclusion. 163 According to the Court, section 108(a) provides
that COD income is excluded from income when a taxpayer is in-
solvent. 164 This exclusion "does not imply that the amount ceases to be
an item of income." 165  The Court found nothing in the statute treating
153. Id. at 1330-31.
154. Id. at 1331.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1330.
157. Id.
158. See generally Pugh, 213 F.3d 1324.
159. In Hogue v. United States, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon also
concluded that COD income is tax-exempt income that passes through to shareholders under section
1366(a), and that under section 108(b)(4)(A), attributes were reduced on the first day of the following
year. 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 426 (D.Or. 2000), available at 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 601, at *6-*7.
160. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 121 S. Ct. 701 (2001).
161. Id. at 709-10.
162. Id. at 708.
163. Id. at 707.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 706.
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excluded COD income differently than the other exclusions set forth in
sections 101 through 136.166
Addressing the Service's argument that excluded COD income is
not tax-exempt income under section 1366(a)(1)(A), the Court noted
that section 1366 applies to "items of income." 167 The fact that the
statute expressly includes tax-exempt income does not mean that it
excludes tax-deferred income. 168 Section 1366 is "worded broadly
enough to include any item of income, even tax-deferred income, that
'could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder."'169
The Court went on to address the timing of attribute reduction. 170
The Court held that this question was expressly addressed in the
statute. 17 1 Section 108(b)(4)(A) provides that the required attribute re-
duction "shall be made after the determination of the tax imposed . . .
for the taxable year of the discharge."172 According to the Court, "In
order to determine the 'tax imposed,' an S corporation shareholder must
adjust his basis in his corporate stock and pass through all items of
income and loss . . . . Consequently, the attribute reduction must be
made after the basis adjustment and pass-through." 173
In a footnote, the Court addressed the argument that section
108(d)(7)(A) mandates that COD income be determined and applied
to reduce tax attributes at the corporate level and therefore cannot
pass through to shareholders.1 74 According to the Court, section
108(d)(7)(A) doesn't state or imply that debt discharge provisions apply
only at the corporate level.175 Section 108(d)(7)(A) does not suspend
the operation of the pass-through rules of Subchapter S.176
The Supreme Court briefly dealt with the concern expressed in
Gaudiano that if COD income is passed through to shareholders before
attribute reduction, there can never be any COD remaining at the
corporate level by which to reduce tax attributes. 177 The Court stated the
statute did not impose the restriction that tax attributes can be reduced
only if COD itself remains at the corporate level; it only requires that tax
166. Id.
167. Id. at 704.
168. Id. at 708.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 708-10.
171. Id.
172. I.R.C. § 108(b)(4)(A) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 108(b)(4)(A)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
173. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 121 S. Ct. 701,709 (2001).
174. Id. at 707 n.6.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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attributes be reduced by the amount excluded from gross income. 178 As
noted by the court:
The very purpose of Subchapter S is to tax at the shareholder
level, not the corporate level. Income is determined at the S
corporation level, see section 1363(b), not in order to tax the
corporation, see section 1363(a) (exempting an S corporation
from income tax), but solely to pass through to the S corpora-
tion's shareholders the corporation's income. Thus, the
controlling provision states that, in determining a shareholder's
liability, "there shall be taken into account the shareholder's
pro rata share of the corporation's . . . items of income (in-
cluding tax-exempt income) ." section 1366(a)(1).
Nothing in section 108(d)(7)(A) suspends the operation of
these ordinary pass-through rules.179
Because tax attributes can be reduced even though excluded COD
income passes through to shareholders and increases their stock basis,
situations may arise where shareholders recognize increased income in
later years. 180 If, for example, the basis of property were reduced under
section 108(b)(2)(E), the shareholders would recognize increased
income as a result of lower depreciation deductions or increased gain
upon sale of the property.
The Supreme Court addressed the taxpayer windfall argument very
briefly, stating as follows: "[b]ecause the Code's plain text permits the
taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy
concern." 18 1
Justice Breyer dissented. 182 In Justice Breyer's opinion, an ambig-
uous statute such as section 108(d)(7)(A) should be read as closing, not
maintaining, tax loopholes.183 Justice Breyer did not contend that
section 108(d)(7)(A) had to be read as requiring that both COD income
exclusion and tax attribute reduction occur at the corporate level, leaving
nothing to flow through to S corporation shareholders. 184 Where the
"practical equivalent of a double deduction" would occur, however, he
178. Id.
179. Id. at 707 n.6.
180. Id. at 708. There was no indication as to whether the taxpayer in Gitlitz had any other tax
attributes to reduce. Id.
181. Id. at 710.
182. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 710-11.
184. Id. at711.
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thought that, absent a clear indication by Congress, this reading of the
statute was the best alternative.185
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court's holding that COD income is an item of
income under section 1366(a)(1)(A) is a correct interpretation of the
statute. Under the plain language of section 1366(a)(1)(A), an item's
status as tax-exempt is irrelevant. Section 1366(a)(1)(A) applies to all
"items of income (including tax-exempt income)." 186
The Supreme Court correctly ruled that the inclusion of tax-exempt
income in section 1366(a)(1)(A) does not mean that tax-deferred
income (if that is what excluded COD income is) is excluded from the
statute. Although there has been much debate about the character of
excluded COD income, the fact of the matter is, its character is irrelevant
to the issue. Section 1366 applies to all items of income and COD
income is clearly an item of income. Judge Beghe summed up the issue
nicely in his concurring opinion in Nelson: "The only relevant inquiry
under section 1366 is not whether COD excluded from gross income of
an insolvent S corporation is 'tax-exempt income,' but whether it's a
passthrough item at all." 187
The timing of tax attribute reduction was the more difficult issue
addressed by the Supreme Court. Although much has been written on
the issue and courts have addressed the issue at great length, the Supreme
Court handled the issue in three short paragraphs. 188 According to the
Supreme Court, the plain text of section 108(b)(4)(A) directs that
attribute reduction be made after the pass-through of excluded COD
income and basis increase. 189 According to the Tax Court, on the other
hand, the plain meaning of section 108(d)(7)(A) precludes income
recognition at the shareholder level.190 Perhaps the Sixth Circuit was the
most correct when it stated that these statutes "become muddy when
they are applied in conjunction with each other."191
Whatever position one has on the proper reading of the relevant
statutes, the issue has been decided. It is now up to Congress to address
185. Id. at 712 (quoting Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934)).
186. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1) (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)).
187. Nelson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 114, 134 (1998) (Beghe, J., concurring), affd 182 F.3d
1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
188. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 121 S. Ct. 701, 708-09 (2001).
189. Id.
190. Nelson, 110 T.C. at 121-22.
191. Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F.3d 524, 533 (6th Cir. 2000).
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the matter if it believes that S corporation shareholders should not be
allowed the windfall of excluding COD income while increasing their
stock basis and deducting previously suspended losses.

